This paper presents an endogenous growth model in which the research activity is …nanced by intermediaries that are able to reduce the incidence of researcher's moral hazard. It is shown that …nancial activity is growth promoting because it increases research productivity. It is also found that a subsidy to the …nancial sector may have larger growth e¤ects than a direct subsidy to research. Moreover, due to the presence of moral hazard, increasing the subsidy rate to R&D may reduce the growth rate. I
Introduction
The renewed interest on growth and their determinants has pointed at the …nancial structure as one of the key factors in the development of nations. This paper introduces a …nancial sector in one of the more recent models of growth, the one …rst presented in Howitt and Aghion (1998) . This framework allows us to explicitly model how the R&D activity is …nanced by means of contracts designed to reduce the incidence of researcher's moral hazard. As a consequence, the …nancial sector will have real e¤ects on the economy.
Analyzing the interaction between …nancial and economic activity has been the aim of a rather proli…c literature. The …rst remarkable reference is the work of Schumpeter at the beginning of the twentieth century. He suggested that …nancial institutions are important for economic activity because they evaluate and …nance entrepreneurs in their research and development projects. Similarly, development economists like Gurley and Shaw (1955) , Goldsmith (1969) , and McKinnon (1973) defended the idea that …nancial development encourages growth because it increases the level of investment and improves its allocation. In addition, they argued that faster growing economies require higher amounts of …nancial services and that the richer the economy, the sooner it is able to pay for …nancial superstructures. Unfortunately, a lack of formal analysis is common to all these papers on development. This is probably because previous to the formulation of a rigorous framework on the relationship between …nance and growth it was necessary to develop further the theory of economic growth.
Neoclassical exogenous growth theory did not o¤er the appropriate frame of reference because …nancial variables could only have level e¤ects. The appearance of the …rst works on endogenous growth determined the starting point of the literature on growth and …nance. Classic references of this …rst line of research are Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) , Smith (1991, 1993) , Levine (1991 Levine ( , 1992 and Saint Paul (1992).
They used the basic Ak framework combined with credit market models of endogenous …nancial intermediation. In these papers, …nancial markets are considered as institutions intended to provide services of risk pooling and collection of information about borrowers.
They also facilitate the ‡ow of resources from savers to investors in the presence of market imperfections. Papers on this area introduce several devices to …ght against adverse selection, moral hazard or liquidity shocks in order to make intermediaries arise endogenously.
The role of intermediation is thus, to reduce the ine¢ciency caused by these imperfections.
Consequently, …nancial institutions promote growth because their activity implies a more e¢cient allocation of resources. With respect to the backward link from growth to …nance suggested by empirical evidence, they follow the basic argument of earlier work. Namely, that there exists a …xed component in the cost of …nancial services and that some limit of wealth must be trespassed before the establishment of a …nancial structure is a¤ordable.
New developments in the theory of economic growth have led to another line of research. Grossman and Helpman (1991b) and Romer (1990) suggested that economic growth comes mainly from the invention and development of new products rather than from the accumulation of physical or human capital. Recovering the Schumpeterian view of the role of …nancial institutions in economic activity, some authors tried to explain how …nancing of innovation can a¤ect the growth process. Good exponents of this literature are King and Levine (1993a) , De la Fuente and Marín (1996) and Blackburn and Hung (1998) . Using this new framework they introduce informational frictions in the credit market, providing a rationale for the appearance of intermediaries. King and Levine consider …nancial intermediaries that act as evaluators of prospective entrepreneurs and as providers of insurance for innovators. However they do not introduce incentive problems. This type of problems can arise because risk averse innovators will try to get full insurance. That is, they will try to get the same payment no matter whether they innovate or not. If this payment is positive, researchers do not have incentives to innovate, especially, if to innovate they must exert e¤ort. The papers by De la Fuente and Marín, and Blackburn and Hung take this moral hazard problem into account though from di¤erent perspectives. The …rst pair of authors provides banks with an imperfect monitoring technology that reveals the innovator's level of e¤ort with a certain probability, while Blackburn and Hung use the costly state veri…cation paradigm, that is, that innovators have incentives to declare that they have not been successful so as to avoid payment. At some cost, investors can verify the result of the project. The common message of this group of papers is that …nancing of innovation is crucial for economic growth, and that the more e¢cient is the …nancial sector the faster the economy will grow. Concerning the feedback e¤ects of growth on …nance, these models provide a natural link without recurring to …xed costs assumptions.
De la Fuente and Marín argue that growth causes changes in factor prices which increase the return to information gathering and hence favor …nancial intermediation activities.
The above growth models used by the latter line of research ignore capital accumulation as a source of growth. Aghion and Howitt (1998) argue that they ignore capital accumulation because it is assumed that labor is the only input into research and that labor is inelastically supplied. Therefore, a rise in capital intensity will have two opposite e¤ects. On one hand, it will make payo¤s to innovation greater but on the other hand, it will increase labor's productivity, making the input to research more expensive. These two e¤ects cancel each other out so that capital accumulation leaves innovative activity una¤ected and thus, it cannot in ‡uence long run growth. 1 However, it is arguable that the only source of growth is innovation and, accordingly, Aghion and Howitt propose another model of creative destruction with capital accumulation. They assume that research is produced out of labor and intermediate inputs. In their model, both R&D activities and capital accumulation determine growth and moreover, they are complementary. Growth cannot go on forever if there were no innovation because diminishing returns would reduce investment while without capital accumulation the rising cost of capital would choke o¤ innovation.
This paper explicitly models the contractual relationship between the researcher and the provider of funds for the project in a model of endogenous technological change in the spirit of Howitt and Aghion (1998) . Financial intermediaries are endowed with a monitoring technology that allows them to force researchers to exert a higher level of e¤ort than the one they would choose in the absence of monitoring. Hence, research productivity is determined in the credit market and thus, may be a¤ected by …nancial variables. In particular, the promotion of …nancial activities will enhance the economy's growth performance. That is, subsidies to …nancial intermediation will increase R&D productivity moving the economy to a faster growing balanced growth path. In addition, a subsidy to …nancial intermediation may be more e¤ective than a direct subsidy to research. The latter policy induces a higher research intensity that rises the growth rate. However, the tax change reduces researchers' incentives to exert e¤ort, which implies higher monitoring costs and a lower R&D productivity. This undercuts the positive growth e¤ects of the research subsidy to the point that for a high enough subsidy rate, the growth e¤ect can become negative.
It is also shown that there exists a negative relationship between the equilibrium level of …nancial services and capital accumulation. The intuition for this comes from the fact that a policy that promotes …nancial activity will increase research productivity and thus, reduce the incentives to accumulate capital due to the business stealing e¤ect. 1 For details see Aghion and Howitt (1998) pages 99-102.
The e¤ect of …nancial activity on research productivity causes two external e¤ects of opposite sign. On one hand, its positive e¤ect on the productivity of the research project will spillover to the other sectors of the economy and it will increase their productivity. On the other hand, the increase in R&D productivity will raise the arrival rate of innovations and consequently, the probability that an incumbent producer is replaced by the latest innovator. The higher probability of being replaced and thus, of losing the ‡ow of pro…ts, discourages capital accumulation. This is the so-called business stealing e¤ect, or creative destruction process. The interaction of these externalities makes the no-tax equilibrium level of …nancial services ine¢cient. Consequently, there exists a role for policies aimed at bringing the provision of …nancial services closer to its e¢cient level.
The paper is divided in 6 sections. Section 2 presents the model, sections 3 and 4 study the steady state and the dynamics of the system respectively, section 5 performs the welfare analysis and section 6 concludes the paper.
The model
I consider a model of creative destruction with capital accumulation and technological spillovers. 2 In the basic model without intermediation, capital accumulation and investment in R&D are the key variables for long run growth. In the present model however, they are not the only ones. This is due to the fact that research productivity is no longer an exogenous parameter. It will be determined by the amount of resources devoted to the …nancial sector of the economy. The availability of …nancial services increases the success probability of projects and, hence, the productivity of research. Thus, …nancial activities will also be relevant for the determination of long run growth.
Consumers
There is a representative consumer who maximizes the present value of utility
I use the logarithmic functional form for simplicity. As usual C t is consumption at date t and ½ is the rate of discount of consumption. 2 The growth model is based on the work of Howitt and Aghion (1998). 
Final good sector
where Y t is …nal good production and A it is the productivity coe¢cient of each sector. I assume equal factor intensities to simplify calculations.
Intermediate goods
The intermediate sector has a monopolistic structure. In order to become the monopolist producer of an intermediate good, the entrepreneur has to buy the patent of the latest version of the product. This patent gives him the right to produce the good until an innovation occurs and the monopolist is displaced by the owner of the new technology.
The only input in the production of intermediate goods is capital. In particular, it is assumed that A it units of capital are needed to produce one unit of intermediate good i
at date t: As we will see, this assumption is necessary in order to obtain stability. The evolution of each sector's productivity coe¢cient; A it is determined in the research sector.
Capital is hired in a perfectly competitive market at the rental rate ³ t : Hence, the cost of one unit of intermediate good is A it ³ t : On the other hand, the equilibrium price of the intermediate good, p(m it ) will be its marginal product
where m it is production of intermediate good i at date t: Thus, the monopolist's pro…t maximization problem is the following:
from where we obtain the pro…t-maximizing supply and the ‡ow of pro…ts as
Thanks to the assumption of equal factor intensity, supply of intermediate goods is equal in all sectors, m it = m t . Thus, the aggregate demand of capital is equal to
be the aggregate productivity coe¢cient. Then, equilibrium in the capital market requires demand to equal supply
or equivalently, the ‡ow of intermediate output must be equal to capital intensity k t ;
With this notation we can express the equilibrium rental rate in terms of capital intensity
Research sector
Innovations are produced using the same technology of the …nal good. Hence, it needs physical capital (embodied in the intermediate goods) apart from labor to be produced.
Technology is assumed to be increasingly complex and hence further innovations will require higher investments. Accordingly, if N t is the amount invested in research, the Poisson arrival rate of innovations will be¸tn t ; where n t = The ‡ow of pro…ts to a monopolist who started producing at t,
is the payo¤ to innovators if they succeed. Because this payment does not depend on the sector, the level of research will be the same across sectors and the aggregate ‡ow of innovations is thus¸tn t : We will assume that A max t grows at a rate proportional to this aggregate ‡ow of innovations
It can be proved (see Appendix A) that the long-run cross-sectorial distribution of the relative productivity parameters, a it = A it A max t ; is time invariant and equal to
To simplify, it is assumed that the initial distribution of a is also H(a).
Consider the arbitrage equation of the research sector. This equation establishes the equality between the expected value of an innovation and its cost at the margin. The value of an innovation at t; V t ; must be the present value of the future ‡ow of pro…ts to the incumbent producer until a new technology displaces the monopolist. This ‡ow of pro…ts
; so the present value is given by
The expected marginal revenue of the innovation must equal its marginal cost. The cost of one unit of research in terms of output is 1. Therefore, since
; the cost of one unit of research intensity is A max t : I assume that there is a proportional tax on innovation that increases its cost. 3 Thus, the marginal cost of increasing research intensity is (1 + ¿ n )A max t units of output, where ¿ n is the tax to innovative activity. Hence, the research arbitrage condition may be written as
Equation (4) gives the research intensity as a function of capital intensity and the endogenously determined arrival rate of innovations,¸t. Thus, the equilibrium level of research is a function of capital intensity and, indirectly, of …nancial intensity. 4 
Capital market
Capital is used as a factor of production in the intermediate goods sector. We have seen that equilibrium in the capital market requires the rental rate to satisfy equation (2) . The owner of a unit of capital will obtain ³ t for it. This amount must be enough to cover the cost of capital. This includes the rate of interest (r t ), the depreciation rate (±), and the tax rate on capital accumulation (¿ k ). Hence, the capital market arbitrage equation is
which establishes a decreasing relationship between the interest rate and capital intensity.
Financing of research
Financial intermediaries channel savings both for its use as capital in production and to …nance research projects. I assume that each intermediary has access to deposits at the market determined rate of interest. There is no risk of bankruptcy because they hold a perfectly diversi…ed portfolio of production loans and research …nancing contracts.
No imperfection is introduced in the provision of production loans. However, I will consider some degree of informational asymmetry in the design of research …nancing contracts. In particular, I assume that researchers have no funds to invest in the project and, therefore, they have to look for external …nance. The limited liability constraint implies that there will exist a potential problem of moral hazard on the part of the researcher. The funds needed for the project will be provided by intermediaries which are endowed with a monitoring technology that allows them to increase the e¤ort of the researcher. Moreover, I assume that the intensity with which the intermediary monitors the researcher determines the additional e¤ort that the former can force the latter to exert, as in Besanko and Kanatas (1993) . It is assumed that there exists a one-to-one relationship between e¤ort and probability of success. Therefore, the monitoring services of the …nancial intermediaries determine R&D productivity.
Consider a research project that requires an initial investment of one unit of output and that will yield a return v with probability¸: Given the research sector outlined in the previous section, the return per unit of output invested, v; must be equal to V A max : The researcher obtains the funds from the intermediary and in exchange she will pay a …x amount p in case of success and nothing otherwise. 5 The expected pro…ts for the researcher are given by
where D(¸) is the disutility caused by the e¤ort necessary to obtain a probability of success equal to¸: We will assume that it takes the following form, which is borrowed from the work of Besanko and Kanatas (1993) :
If the researcher received no monitoring at all, the level of e¤ort he would exert would
This no-monitoring level of e¤ort is implementable at no cost for the intermediary. However, if the intermediary wishes to impose a higher level of e¤ort, he will have to face a cost which I assume increasing and convex in the di¤erence between the desired level of e¤ort and¸0. 6 In particular, I assume that in order to obtain a success probability of¸; the investment required is given by the following expression:
and therefore, the pro…ts of the intermediary can be written as
where ¿ f is a tax on the monitoring activities of intermediaries.
There exists a large number of intermediaries that compete in the provision of …nancial services. A researcher will choose one of them on the basis of his supply of …nancial services since it will determine the probability of success of her project. However, once the researcher chooses an intermediary to …nance her project, she will not be able to break this contract and ask another bank for …nance. This assumption can be justi…ed by the existence of switching costs or by the reluctancy of research …rms to reveal information about their project. In addition, the fact that once the choice is made the researcher cannot turn to another intermediary implies that the bank is placed in a position of power in its relationship with the researcher. In particular, for a given¸; the intermediary will be able to impose the payment that maximizes his pro…ts, i.e.
The fact that the intermediary is able to impose the payment that maximizes his pro…ts does not mean that the researcher is not going to gain with the contract. Indeed, the nature of the limited liability constraint implies that the researcher is always going to obtain a positive payment in expected terms. 7 Notice also that this payment scheme implies a 6 See Besanko and Kanatas (1993) for details. 7 Recall that the payment is positive in case of success and zero in case of failure, which yields a positive payment in expected terms. In order to guarantee that the expected payment is positive we have to impose some restrictions on the parameters. In particular, we require
negative relationship between p and¸: This is optimal for the intermediary because p is positively related to the monitoring cost of obtaining a given level of e¤ort. Additionally, if the researcher is subject to an intensive control, she will have to pay less to the intermediary while there is a higher probability that the project succeeds. This may compensate the researcher for the intensive monitoring. In fact, if the relationship between p and¸is given by (6) , the expected pro…ts of the researcher become monotonically increasing iņ : Hence, this contract makes monitoring desirable for the researcher, since it will reduce the share of the intermediary in the project's return and increase the probability that the project succeeds. As a consequence, a researcher will choose the intermediary that o¤ers the highest level of monitoring services. Therefore, no¸that implies a positive amount of pro…ts will be an equilibrium since any intermediary can attract all the researchers by marginally increasing the degree of monitoring intensity and hence the probability of success. If the number of intermediaries is su¢ciently large to impede agreements that limit competition, in equilibrium bank pro…ts will be zero. Therefore, the equilibrium probability of success will be the highest value of¸that implies zero pro…ts. That is, it is the positive root of¸p
which yields a positive relationship between the productivity of research and the value of the project, as expressed by¸=~(
Equilibrium
Equations (4), (5) and (7) determine partial equilibrium in each market. These equations can be combined in order to obtain the following equilibrium conditions for each market:
(a) Research market equilibrium
(b) Capital market equilibrium
(c) Credit market equilibrium¸t
Notice that the research arbitrage condition has been modi…ed to take into account the payment to the intermediary.
Equations (6) and (8) imply the following equilibrium expression for¸:
Hence, research productivity is time invariant and depends only upon the research and credit markets' structural parameters.
Using (11), equation (10) may be written in the following form:
where
Thus, the system formed by equations (8), (9) and (10) can be reduced to the following system: 8¸=
which determines the equilibrium values of k t and n t : Notice also that from equations (12) and (13) one can obtain the equilibrium relationship between n t and k t as given by
With this equilibrium relationship the model can be reduced to a dynamic system of two di¤erential equations in capital and consumption. The law of motion of capital is given by
where E t is the total amount of resources invested in monitoring. If M (¸¡¸0) is the monitoring cost per unit of output invested in research, then E t must equal M (¸¡¸0)N t :
Notice that in equilibrium M (¸¡¸0) is a constant. Thus, in order to simplify, let us
so that E t will be equal to eN t :
The law of motion for consumption comes from utility maximization
In order to obtain a system with steady state, express all variables in terms of e¢ciency
and substitute the equilibrium expressions for r t ; g t and n t in equations (15) and (16) to express the system in terms of capital intensity and consumption per e¢ciency unit
Due to the non-linearity of the system it must be linearized around the steady state in order to analyze the local dynamics. Accordingly, we will study the system at the steady state in the next section.
Steady State Analysis
In a steady state all variables grow at a constant rate. If we substitute the equilibrium
At in the aggregate production function, we obtain the usual CobbDouglas functional form at the aggregate level
9 Note that
Therefore,
This expression implies that the rate of growth of output will be that of the aggregate productivity coe¢cient and, given that A t is proportional to the leading edge coe¢cient, the growth rate of the economy will be g = ¾¸n;
where¸and n are constant and determined jointly with k through the equilibrium conditions of research, capital and credit markets. 10 These conditions, evaluated at the steady state, are the following:©
from where we obtain
and the equation that implicitly determines the steady state value of k; which is the result of plugging (18) into (17)
The steady state growth rate can be expressed in terms of capital intensity using
The use of implicit di¤erentiation allows us to analyze the e¤ect on k of parameter changes,
and to obtain the following comparative statics results:
The steady state growth rate increases with subsidies to capital accumulation and to …nancial activity. The growth rate is increasing (decreasing) in ¿ n when
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2
The steady state growth rate is increasing in ¾ (the size of innovations); decreasing in ½ and ± and increasing in s (the scale parameter of the monitoring costs) and¯(the scale parameter of the disutility of e¤ort).
Proposition 1 establishes a marginal positive relation between …nancial activity and growth. This relation may be understood because a subsidy to …nancial activity (or equivalently a reduction in ¿ f ) implies a lower monitoring cost. Thus, monitoring intensity increases. Accordingly, the positive growth e¤ect of this policy is due to the externality that …nancial activity causes on the accumulation of public knowledge. Promoting …nancial activity is equivalent to increase the productivity of R&D and thus, to make a better use of the resources allocated to research.
The result obtained for the growth e¤ects of research subsidies re ‡ects the moral hazard problem of R&D. The smaller cost of research represents an increase of the expected return for researchers that does not depend on the e¤ort they exert. It can be shown that a lower ¿ n reduces the no monitoring level of e¤ort. 11 This implies a higher monitoring cost and, thus,¸falls. Therefore, even though we expect a positive e¤ect on research intensity, the R&D productivity reduction may be enough to cause a negative e¤ect on the growth rate. Aghion and Howitt (1998) argue that capital accumulation and innovation are complementary factors for long run growth. To illustrate this assertion, they reduce the capital tax, a measure that directly a¤ects the capital market, and study the reaction of the economy. The reduction of the cost of capital rises the equilibrium value of capital intensity making the ‡ow of pro…ts accruing to a successful innovator grow. Consequently, investment in the research sector will increase. Thus a policy that directly favors capital accumulation also incentives innovation and economic growth. The same argument can be applied in the present model. Therefore, innovation and capital accumulation continue being complementary factors for long run growth. Furthermore, this policy has no negative 11 The equilibrium expression for¸0 is given by
Thus, the result follows immediately.
e¤ects either on¸0 or on¸: Thus, a subsidy to capital accumulation may be preferable in terms of growth to a direct subsidy to research.
We can perform the same experiment on …nancial activity. Thus, let us reduce the …nancial tax. The lower monitoring cost stimulates the production of …nancial services, inducing a rise in the arrival rate of innovations and, consequently, a larger rate of creative destruction. This discourages capital investment because the incumbent monopolist faces a larger probability of being replaced. Thus, the e¤ect on capital accumulation is negative. That is, a policy that incentives …nancial activity will make the economy grow faster even though it will discourage capital investment. Therefore, capital and …nancial intensity should be considered substitutive factors for long run growth. Notice that this negative e¤ect of research …nancing on capital accumulation undercuts the growth e¤ects of intermediation promoting policies.
At the no-tax equilibrium a marginal reduction of any of the three taxes would increase the growth rate. In order to identify the most e¤ective policy, the tax changes are made equivalent in terms of the amount of resources generated for the government budget. The budget constraint of the government is given by
where T is the lump-sum transference or tax used to balance the budget when we introduce a policy change. In order to make two policy changes equivalent, the change induced on T must be the same. Therefore, to compare the growth e¤ects of ¿ k ; ¿ f and ¿ n ; we must compare the following expressions:
which allow us to establish the following propositions:
Proposition 3 At the no-tax equilibrium, the growth e¤ect of ¿ f is stronger than the growth e¤ect of ¿ n ; i.e.,
Proposition 4
At the no-tax equilibrium, the growth e¤ect of ¿ f is stronger than the growth e¤ect of ¿ k ; i.e.
Kt ; whenever
Proposition 3 implies that, at the no-tax equilibrium, subsidizing the …nancial sector will be more growth promoting than directly subsidizing research. Similarly, Proposition 4 implies that the …nancial tax may have larger e¤ects on growth than the capital tax.
Therefore, there exist situations in which subsidizing …nancial activity is the most e¤ective policy in order to improve the growth performance of the economy. Notice that in the case of Proposition 4, condition (21) is expressed in terms of k which is an endogenous variable. Consequently, it could happen that the condition is never satis…ed. However, by means of calibration, it is relatively easy to …nd sets of parameters for which the condition is satis…ed. Notice also that the e¤ectiveness of the …nancial tax depends upon s; the scale parameter for monitoring costs. A small s means a large monitoring cost and a low monitoring intensity, e. Therefore, the lower the s, the smaller the relative amount of resources allocated to …nancial services in equilibrium and the stronger the marginal e¤ect we can induce on monitoring intensity. To sum up, this result proposes the use of subsidies or tax cuts to …nancial activity as an alternative instrument to promote innovation without the moral hazard problems of direct research subsidies.
Dynamics
After analyzing the behavior of the economy at its long run equilibrium, the system can now be linearized so as to study the dynamics of the model around the steady state. Recall that the system is formed by the following equations:
The linearized system is obtained computing the Jacobian of the system and evaluating it at the steady state. In order to simplify notation let us express the system as follows
Then the derivatives needed are the following:
With this notation the linearized system will be
The determinant of the matrix of the system is equal to the function Á k (k; c) evaluated at the steady state, which can be proved to be negative. Therefore the system presents local saddle path stability. For future reference, let¸1 be the negative eigenvalue and¸2 the positive one.
Welfare analysis
Now that we have characterized the dynamics of the system we can analyze the welfare implications of changes in tax parameters.
From equation (1) we can express utility at the steady state in terms of the stationary level of consumption and the long-run growth rate
The change in steady state welfare is a combination of the change in steady state consumption and the change in steady state growth
This measure of welfare is valid to compare two situations of long run equilibrium.
However, it does not consider the periods of transition during which the economy moves from one equilibrium to another. In order to re ‡ect the transition we must analyze the e¤ect on lifetime utility. Rewrite equation (1) to obtain the following expression for lifetime utility as a function of the di¤erent tax rates (¿ i where i = k; f; n:):
where g t (¿ i ) and c t (¿ i ) are the time paths of the growth rate and the level of consumption per e¢ciency unit after a change in one of the tax parameters. The e¤ect on utility will thus be given by the e¤ects on the paths of growth and consumption. I will obtain …rst the e¤ect on the paths of consumption and capital intensity and then use the latter to get the e¤ect on the path of the growth rate.
Let c = p(k; ¿ i ) be the saddle path of the system which can be interpreted as the graph of a policy function relating consumption and capital. Then, we know that its slope p k ; is positive and equal to
Substituting the policy function into the law of motion of k; the equilibrium dynamics of the system can be characterized by a single di¤erential equation which describes the evolution of the state variable along the stable manifold.
The solution to this equation, k t (¿ i ), gives the equilibrium value of k as a function of time and the tax parameter: Using k t (¿ i ) in the policy function we would obtain the time path
To calculate the change in welfare we need the derivative of the whole time path of c with
where p ¿ i is the derivative of the policy function with respect to the tax or graphically, the shift in the saddle path caused by the policy change.
In order to compute
; notice that k t (¿ i ) = k(t; ¿ i ) must satisfy identically the original equation
di¤erentiate both sides with respect to ¿ i
Hence k ¿ i satis…es a linear di¤erential equation. Moreover, when we start from a steady state, the coe¢cients of this equation are constant and we can write
The general solution is given by
Since k is a predetermined variable, the change at the date of the policy change k ¿ i (0) must be zero. The long run e¤ect,
; is in fact the derivative of the steady state value of k with respect to the tax parameter, and can be expressed as
The equilibrium time path of the derivative of k with respect to ¿ i is thus given by
that is, k will gradually reach its new steady state value at a rate equal to the negative eigenvalue.
Substitute now in equation (23) to obtain the …nal expression for the derivative of the time path of consumption with respect to the tax parameter
As before, we can identify the immediate change and the long run e¤ect
where the …rst represents the necessary jump of consumption to get on the new saddle path and the second is the e¤ect on the steady state value of consumption. Thus, consumption will initially jump to the new saddle path and then it will approach its new steady state value at a rate equal to¸1:
The derivative of the growth rate and consumption per e¢ciency unit at date t are given by
Notice that the derivatives of g d are evaluated at the steady state because we consider the stationary equilibrium as the situation before the tax change.
Expressions (24) and (25) allow us to write the change in welfare as follows:
Equations (22) and (26) give the general expressions for the e¤ect of the three taxes on the di¤erent measures of welfare. Let us see now the speci…c results for each policy.
Tax on capital
The e¤ect on welfare of the capital tax is given by
where the …rst expression represents the e¤ect on welfare if the transition is excluded.
Both the expression in square brackets in equation (27) and @k @¿ k are negative. Therefore, the e¤ect on welfare using the second measure will always be larger than the e¤ect if we use the …rst measure.
Proposition 1 shows that @g @¿ k is negative. However, the e¤ect on consumption is ambiguous. The derivative of consumption with respect to the capital tax is given by
The functional form of this derivative implies that for large enough values of steady state capital intensity; the derivative will be positive while it may be negative for smaller values of k: Since the relationship between k and the capital tax is negative, this suggests that for negative or small values of ¿ k we might expect a positive e¤ect on consumption while for large values of the tax, @c @¿ k may become negative. Therefore, we may roughly represent the relationship between consumption and the capital tax as an inverted U-shaped curve whose maximum shifts right or left depending on the structural characteristics of the economy.
In summary, there may exist a consumption maximizing value of ¿ k but whether it is a subsidy or a tax depends upon the economy considered. These results can also be applied to the relationship between welfare and this tax. I have calibrated the model for a usually accepted set of parameters obtaining that in every case, the welfare maximizing rate of this policy instrument was a subsidy. 12 Consequently, in economies with a positive capital tax rate, a tax reduction will generally cause a welfare improvement.
Tax on …nancial services
The welfare derivatives for the …nancial tax are
and given that @k @¿ f is positive, the e¤ect on welfare of this tax will always be smaller if we consider the transition.
As before, we know that the derivative of the growth rate with respect to this tax is negative. The e¤ect on consumption is given by
In order to simplify the analysis, the range of values of the tax parameters is restricted so that we can give an unambiguous sign to this derivative. To this end, we will not consider values of the capital tax rate below ¡½ nor subsidy rates to the research sector above : Under these assumptions, we can establish the following proposition:
; the derivative of steady state consumption per e¢ciency unit with respect to the …nancial tax is positive.
Proof. See Appendix
Consequently, a marginal change in the …nancial tax will cause opposite e¤ects on growth and consumption, depending the …nal change in welfare on which e¤ect dominates.
Obviously, the value of the discount rate is determinant for the sign of
: This derivative will be positive whenever
is positive. A small ½ means that consumers weight more heavily the growth e¤ect of the tax. Thus, if ½ is small enough, welfare will increase with reductions of the …nancial tax. Notice also that for a given discount rate, increases in ¿ f make steady state consumption per e¢ciency unit grow. Therefore, we may expect positive e¤ects on welfare for low values of the tax though they may disappear as the tax rate increases. Hence, we also …nd the inverted U-shaped curve representing the relationship between welfare and the …nancial tax.
A calibration of the model gives a rough idea of how can …nancial policies improve welfare. At the no tax equilibrium and for the same set of parameters used before, I
obtain the following results: Table 1 Calibration for ½ = 0:02 at the no-tax equilibrium. A negative sign of the welfare derivative means that the optimal policy is to reduce the …nancial tax. Conversely, a positive entry implies that the optimal policy is a tax increase.
This calibration suggests that …nancial services will be underprovided in a relatively capital intensive economy while in less capital intensive economies, a reduction of its provision could increase welfare. Recall that the …nancial sector has real e¤ects on the economy only because it can modify the productivity of research. A high ® means a relatively high equilibrium value of k which in turn implies a high research intensity. Therefore, a policy that favors monitoring and thus, increases the productivity of research, will have larger growth e¤ects in an economy with a relatively higher research intensity. This larger growth e¤ect will be able to compensate for the reduction in steady state consumption per e¢ciency unit. On the contrary, if ® is small, so is equilibrium research intensity and thus, the higher productivity in this case will not be able to induce a large enough increase in the growth rate.
Tax on research activity
The welfare derivatives for the research tax are
and as with the …nancial tax, the fact that @k @¿ n is positive makes the e¤ect on welfare of this tax smaller if we consider the transition.
The derivative of steady state consumption per e¢ciency unit is given by the following expression:
The e¤ect of the research tax on consumption is established in the next proposition:
and ¿ k > ¡½; the derivative of steady state consumption per e¢ciency unit with respect to the research tax is positive.
Given that the e¤ect on growth of this tax is negative, the …nal e¤ect on welfare will depend upon the discount rate. 13 As with the …nancial tax, if ½ is small enough, welfare may increase with a reduction of research taxation. In general though, we expect the typical inverted-U relationship in the sense that increases of the research tax may initially improve welfare though further increases could …nally harm it.
If the government were considering whether to subsidize the research or the …nancial sector, we know that the …nancial tax will have larger e¤ects on growth and in this sense it would be preferable. 14 However, we must consider also the e¤ect on consumption. We would like to have the result that the e¤ect on consumption of the …nancial subsidy is smaller since consumption will be reduced. However, we …nd the opposite result. That is, a …nancial subsidy will cause a larger reduction in steady state consumption per e¢ciency unit than a research subsidy. Consequently, whether one policy is preferable to the other in terms of welfare will depend upon the discount rate of the economy. A calibration of the model for ½ = 0:02; yields the following results: Table 2 Welfare e¤ects of ¿ f and ¿ n 14 In what follows, I assume that the initial situation is the no-tax equilibrium. Therefore, the e¤ect on growth of the two subsidies is positive being the …nancial tax more e¤ective.
Notice that the sign of the welfare derivative with respect to the research tax is positive in every case. This means that a subsidy (a marginal reduction of the tax) would reduce welfare. In other words, the positive growth e¤ect is not enough to compensate for the negative e¤ect on steady state consumption per e¢ciency unit. Therefore, if the government wishes to increase welfare, the appropriate policy is a research tax increase.
With respect to the other policy instrument, the …nancial tax, the e¤ect on welfare of the latter is larger when ® is either very large or very small. Thus, if we consider ® = 0:75 as a proxy for the capital intensity of a developed economy, a policy that promotes the …nancing of research projects by intermediaries dominates a direct subsidy to research both in terms of growth and welfare.
Conclusions
Innovation is nowadays recognized as one of the most important factors of economic growth. However, the presence of informational asymmetries and the di¢cult appropriation of R&D's external e¤ects cause ine¢ciencies that may reduce the private production of innovation. This paper analyses the consequences on economic growth of the activity of …nancial intermediaries that try to reduce the incidence of moral hazard on research.
There exists moral hazard because in the absence of monitoring, researchers choose the amount of e¤ort that maximizes their expected utility, a smaller level of e¤ort than the one that would maximize the expected value of the project. The no-monitoring level of e¤ort is smaller because the researcher receives only a part of the value of the innovation while the rest goes to the intermediary. However, the intermediary is provided with a monitoring technology that enables him to impose a higher e¤ort. The monitoring intensity will determine the amount of e¤ort a¤ordable and the probability of success of the research project. This paper shows that a policy that incentives monitoring is able to improve the growth performance of the economy due to its positive e¤ect on R&D productivity.
Furthermore, it is shown that directly subsidizing research may reduce the growth rate of the economy. The negative e¤ect on growth of a research subsidy may appear because it accentuates the incidence of moral hazard. As a consequence, this paper proposes subsidies to capital accumulation and to …nancial activity as alternative growth promoting policies. The advantage of these policies with respect to the research subsidy is that they do not see their e¤ects undercut by a reduction of R&D productivity.
A subsidy to …nancial activity increases the growth rate of the economy. However, its e¤ect on steady state consumption per e¢ciency unit is negative. Therefore, the actual value of the discount rate will determine the sign of the welfare e¤ect in each case. Nevertheless, for a typical value of the discount rate, it is obtained that …nancial services will be underprovided in relatively capital intensive economies while they will be overprovided in less capital intensive economies. This may be due to the interaction of two externalities of opposite sign. On the one hand, the positive e¤ect of …nancial activities on R&D productivity makes the whole economy more productive since the growth rate of aggregate productivity depends positively on the arrival rate of innovations. However, the magnitude of this positive e¤ect depends upon the relative importance of the research sector which in turn is determined by capital intensity. Thus, the more capital intensive the economy, the greater this e¤ect will be. On the other hand, a higher probability of success due to a more intense monitoring implies a higher probability of replacement for the incumbent producer. This discourages capital accumulation. Whether the reduction in the equilibrium level of capital causes a large or a small e¤ect depends upon the initial situation of the economy. If capital intensity was relatively low, the initial equilibrium level of capital is relatively small and a further reduction will have large negative e¤ects on the economy. On the contrary, if the economy was in an equilibrium with a large level of capital per e¢ciency unit, a reduction will not represent a big damage. Thus, the positive externality is stronger when capital intensity is high, while the negative externality has larger e¤ects when the economy is less capital intensive. Therefore, policies aimed at balancing the e¤ects of the two externalities will be welfare improving.
A Proofs of propositions
Proof that H(a) is the limiting distribution of relative productivities.
(Adapted from Aghion and Howitt (1998))
Let F (¢; t) denote the cumulative distribution of the absolute productivity parameters, A; across sectors at date t: Pick any A > 0 and let it be the leading edge coe¢cient at
Equation (29) gives the rate at which the fraction of sectors with a productivity coe¢cient smaller than A falls. This rate is given by the ‡ow of innovations occurred in the sectors or equivalently
De…ne a to be the relative productivity
By construction, ©(t) is the fraction of sectors in which the productivity coe¢cient is less than A: Hence, the last equation establishes that this fraction is given by equation (3) at date t if a is the relative productivity at t of a sector that innovated on or after date t 0 : If t is large enough, this will include almost all values of a between 0 and 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. The signs of the derivatives of the growth rate depend upon the signs of the derivatives of the steady state capital intensity. Consider equations (19) which de…nes the steady state values of k. Straightforward di¤erentiation yields
expression which is negative for the range of values assumed for the parameters. The sign of the derivative in (30) depends upon
This derivative is negative if and only if ¿ n > ¡ s 2¯(1+¿ f )¡s : Therefore,
Given the signs of the derivatives of k with respect to the di¤erent taxes, the e¤ects on growth can be obtained recalling that the following equation must hold in equilibrium:
Consequently, the derivative of the growth rate with respect to the capital tax is given by
or equivalently
which is unambiguously negative. Therefore, the growth rate depends negatively on the capital tax and thus, a subsidy increase or a reduction of the tax would enhance growth.
The derivatives of the growth rate with respect to the …nancial tax and to the innovation tax are
and
Given the signs of the derivatives of k we have previously obtained, the corresponding results of Proposition 1 follow.
Proof of Proposition 2. The derivative of k with respect to ¾ is given by the following expression:
which is negative. Thus, capital intensity at the steady state is negatively related to ¾. In consequence, the derivative of g with respect to ¾ is positive.
The other two results are immediate since the derivative of g with respect to ± is equal to the derivative with respect to ¿ k and the derivative of k with respect to ½ satis…es
Therefore, if the derivative of g with respect to ¿ k is negative, so is the derivative of g with respect to ½:
Regarding the e¤ect on the growth rate of changes in s and¯; notice that : At the no tax equilibrium this inequality is given by the following expression:
or equivalently 1 e @k @¿ f > @k @¿ n :
This inequality holds whenever
Evaluating both derivatives at the no-tax equilibrium and simplifying we obtain that the condition for the inequality to hold is s < 4 7¯:
The parameters involved in the last expression (s and¯) must be positive and satisfy the following condition:
which is necessary to guarantee a positive expected value of the project for the researcher.
Therefore, at the no-tax equilibrium, the growth e¤ect of ¿ f is larger than the growth e¤ect of ¿ n :
Proof of Proposition 4. The growth e¤ect of ¿ f is larger in absolute value than the growth e¤ect of ¿ k when The second term of (31) will be positive whenever
2´i s negative. This derivative is given by the following expression, which is negative when ¿ n > ¡ The third term of (31) may be expressed as follows:
For ¿ n > ¡ 5 7 and ¿ f¸¿ n ; this expression is positive. However, if ¿ f < ¿ n the sign of the whole expression is not so obvious. When ¿ f < ¿ n ; the second term of expression (32) is increasing in s: Therefore, it will approach its minimum value when s goes to zero. This implies that
or equivalently that the term in brackets of equation (32) is larger than is negative. However, the last term has an ambiguous sign. The derivative in brackets may be expressed as
Thus, the sum of the second and third term of (33) yields
Next, use (18) in order to write expression (34) as follows:
The …rst term is positive while the sign of the second term is determined by
expression that happens to be positive for ¿ n > ¡ s 2¯(1+¿ f )¡s :
